

Alienation, Class Consciousness, and Urbanization: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

INTRODUCTION

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels are usually not regarded as social theorists of modern urbanization. Yet, in many respects their work was a response to the degraded living conditions of capitalist urbanization in the nineteenth century. The physical theatre, as it were, in which the social upheaval and revolutionary epoch were to take place was the modern industrial city. In a very real sense, while labour, the creation of a working class, alienation, and the rise and eventual fall of capitalism were the principal themes of their writings, the modern metropolis and all it stood for was to be the principal venue in which these phenomena would unfold. Without the creation of a modern metropolis, neither the industrial system of factory production, nor the modern proletariat, the very linchpin of Marx's social system, would exist.

At the same time, the modern metropolis was quite literally the child of industrial capitalism. It was this symbiotic relationship between the modern metropolis and capitalism that led Marx and Engels to celebrate the subjugation of the countryside to the rule of the town and the rise of the industrial city. Because both Marx and Engels believed in the optimistic progress of history, they argued that the development of the modern metropolis signalled the beginning of a new and progressive historical epoch. As such, the metropolis for Marx and Engels was the city of dreams *par excellence*.¹

Modern urban life, according to Marx and Engels, serves as a kind of hot-house that provides the ideal environment for nurturing working-class consciousness. This judgment was expressed in works such as *The Communist Manifesto*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, and *The Civil War in France*. It was implicit in the analysis of the historical tendencies of capital accumulation and their social consequences that Marx undertook in *Capital*.

Perhaps the clearest expression of this point of view in the work of Marx and Engels can be found in Engels's *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Engels wrote this work in 1844 when he was a twenty-four-year-old German émigré businessman who found himself at the very centre of the industrial revolution when he took up residence in Manchester to supervise his family's textile business.²

If the concentration of population in urban centres furthers the expansion of middle class power, at the same time it leads to an even more rapid development: among the working classes. The workers begin to feel themselves members of a homogeneous social group. They realize that, although they are weak as individuals, they are strong if united. Urban life tends to divide the proletariat into a compact group with its own ways of life and thought and its own outlook on society. The worker begins to realize that he is being oppressed and the proletariat develops into a class which has both social and political significance. In this way the great cities are the birthplace of the working-class movement. It is there that the workers first began to reflect upon the conditions under which they live and began to struggle to alter them. The cities first saw the rise of the workers and the middle classes into opposing social groups. It was in the towns that the trade union movement, Chartism and socialism all had their origin. The sickness of society which was chronic in the countryside, became acute in the towns, with the result that its true nature and the proper means of effecting a cure were both revealed. But for the growth of the big towns and their stimulating influence on the discussion of the questions of the day, the workers would not have made the progress which in fact they have done.³

Clearly, Engels had great confidence in the contribution that urban society would make in the formation of a class-conscious proletariat. It was this confidence that was later shared by Marx and carried forward in their joint work. As such, Engels and Marx were both modernists who sought to refashion the world and believed that the metropolis provided the ideal factory for the production of this new universe. So utopian was their dream that they envisaged human history beginning only after this massive new project of social revolution had taken place. Like the dreamers who shot out the clock towers during the French Revolution to make time stand still and introduced a new calendar, they were passionate, youthful partisans of the modernist vision.⁴

Nevertheless, there is present in Engels's work on Manchester a passage that is a puzzling contradiction to the optimistic conclusions he reached about the political implications of urban life. This passage foreshadows the later work of the classical sociologists, particularly that of Georg Simmel, whose vision of the metropolis was less of a dream and more a nightmare. In this passage, which is part of the chapter "The Great Towns," Engels expresses his great distaste for the anonymous and atomized quality of life in the emerging metropolises that are typified by London. He suggests that the massing of humanity that is characteristic of the metropolis sacrifices the welfare and the human potential of the majority of residents, in order "that a small, closely knit group of their fellow citizens could develop to the full the qualities with which nature has endowed them."⁵ The rise of the industrial metropolis has not

occurred without an important alteration in the character of social relations.

Hundreds and thousands of men and women drawn from all classes and ranks of society pack the streets of London. Are they not all human beings? With the same innate characteristics and potentialities? Are they not all equally interested in the pursuit of happiness? And do they not all aim at happiness by following similar methods? Yet they rush past each other as if they had nothing in common. They are tacitly agreed on one thing only, that everyone should keep to the right of the pavement so as not to collide with the stream of people moving in the opposite direction. No one even thinks of sparing a glance for his neighbours in the streets. The more that Londoners are packed into a tiny space the more repulsive and disgraceful becomes the brutal indifference with which they ignore their neighbours and selfishly concentrate upon their private affairs. We know well enough that this isolation of the individual—this narrow minded egotism—is everywhere the fundamental principle of modern society. But nowhere is this selfish egotism so blatantly evident as in the frantic bustle of the great city. The disintegration of society into individuals each guided by his private principles and each pursuing his own aims has been pushed to its furthest limits in London. Here indeed human society has been split into its component atoms.⁶

Despite this suggestion by Engels that metropolitan life embodied the atomizing qualities that were an integral part of the emerging capitalist order, neither he nor Marx ever concluded that perhaps the city could be as much a negative as a positive factor in the development of revolutionary working-class consciousness. Instead, their dream of the city as a place for historic revolution and the beginning of the new millenium remained intact. It was, therefore, Marx and Engels's judgment on the city as a positive factor in promoting class consciousness, rather than the analysis of the atomization of social relations in urban society as, itself, characteristic of capitalist development, that became the received Marxist orthodoxy. Like most dreamers, they were prepared to turn away from any contradictory evidence that might corrode their faith in their vision.

The response of Marx and Engels to the degradation of the human spirit and the destruction of community that characterized the nineteenth-century metropolis was thus optimistic. This optimism contrasts, as we shall see, rather sharply with the response of other late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century writers such as Ferdinand Toennies and Georg Simmel. Given their perspective, it is not surprising that Marx and Engels derided what they referred to as the "idiocy of rural life." This notion of rural existence is symptomatic of Marx and Engels's Darwinian view on the progressiveness of capitalist industrialization.

In his work on English working-class life, for example, Engels had described the healthful open spaces and fresh air of rural working-class conditions as bordering on a vegetative existence. The apparent fact that

rural workers did not suffer from overwork in foul-smelling and polluted factories and had considerable time for leisure was of less importance than their marginal status as human beings.

So the workers vegetated through a passably comfortable existence leading a righteous and peaceful life in all piety and probity; and their material position was far better than that of their successors. They did not need to overwork, yet they did no more than they chose to do, and yet earned what they needed. . . . What the moral and intellectual character of this class was may be guessed. Shut off from the towns, which they never entered, their yarn and woven stuff being delivered to travelling agents for payment of wages. . . . The weavers stood upon the moral and intellectual plane of the yeoman with whom they were usually immediately connected through their little holdings. They regarded their squire, the greatest landholder of the region, as their natural superior; . . . They were "respectable" people. . . . In short they lived and thought . . . without mental activity and without violent fluctuations in their position in life. They could rarely read and far more rarely write; went regularly to church, never talked politics, never conspired, never thought, delighted in physical exercises, listened with inherited reverence when the Bible was read, and were, in their unquestioning humility, exceedingly well disposed towards the superior classes. But intellectually they were dead; lived only for their petty, private interest, for their looms and gardens, and knew nothing of the mighty movement which, beyond their horizon, was sweeping through mankind. They were comfortable in their silent vegetation, and but for the industrial revolution they would never have emerged from this existence, which, cosily romantic as it was, was nevertheless not worthy of human beings. In truth, they were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time. The industrial revolution had simply carried this out to its logical end by making the workers machines pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity, and so forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men.⁷

This passage is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it reveals the typical intellectual arrogance about the superiority of an active urban way of life to a quiescent rural one, an attitude that characterized both Marx and Engels. On the other hand, it confirms the notion that Marx and Engels believed that urban life was a necessary condition for the development of both class consciousness and a meaningful public sphere. This was undoubtedly one of the reasons they were so vehemently opposed to romantic socialism, which often looked back toward pastoral society with considerable nostalgia. For as true believers in the Enlightenment concept of historical progress, they rejected this romantic socialism as reactionary rather than progressive.⁸

The development of industry and the mass industrial towns thus symbolized for Marx and Engels not just the immiseration of the proletariat, but the basis of their emancipation, and with that the emancipation of

society as a whole. While the progress of industry meant the homogenization of working conditions and wage levels and the growing commodification of labour, it also laid the basis for the development of class consciousness. This class consciousness would emerge out of the growing "union of workers." This union would be

helped by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry and that places the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes.⁹

The importance that Marx attributed to urban culture in the development of class consciousness is also clear from his historical analysis of the failure of the French peasantry to develop a progressive class position that would have allied them with the urban proletariat instead of to the regime of Louis Bonaparte during the political upheavals of 1846 to 1851 in France. In his political analysis of this period, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* written in 1852, Marx argued that the French peasantry lacked the necessary interconnections to develop progressive class consciousness:

The small land-holding peasants form a vast mass, the numbers of which live in similar condition without entering into manifold relations with one another. *Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse.* The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communications and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and therefore no diversity of development, no variety of talent, *no wealth of social relationships.* Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient, it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages . . . a Department. In this way the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small land-holding peasants, *and the identity of their interests begets no community,* no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name.¹⁰

What Marx here identifies as the principal bulwark against the development of class consciousness among the French peasantry—the absence

of social relations in either work or in daily life beyond the workplace, the low level of interpersonal communications, the lack of a sense of community, and the general sense of privatization—are precisely those features of daily life that he believed would be reversed in the modern metropolis. The response of Marx and Engels, then, to the crisis of the nineteenth-century city was to focus on the development of working-class political consciousness. It was to be that revolutionary consciousness, itself a product of life in the urban metropolis, that would redeem humanity from the alienated circumstances of modern metropolitan capitalism.

Marx and Engels's response to the crisis of urban alienation is significant because it provides us with a perspective that is still an implicit ingredient in much contemporary work on urban policy and urban politics. Yet, at the same time, the work of later writers such as Georg Simmel, Ferdinand Toennies, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim on the nature of urban society raises considerable doubts about the accuracy of the Marxist vision. As such, one must compare the dream of Marx and Engels with the more pessimistic vision of these writers.

In order to pose this problem more acutely, it is necessary to explore in some detail Marx and Engels's theory of class consciousness. Only with a detailed knowledge of their theory of consciousness can we assess the relative merits of their position as opposed to that of classical social theory on the character of modern urban society and the possibilities for progressive political change. The nature of their dream, as we shall see, is complex and intertwined with a philosophical and sociological reading of the modern condition. Its very power and appeal lie not only in its dream-like quality, but in the very logical nature of the dream itself. It is a dream that only the modern mind could have produced. And yet, its emotional appeal lies at the very heart of the human condition.

SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

If one searches for a theory of class consciousness in the work of Marx and Engels, one rapidly discovers that this theory is inseparable from Marx's social ontology.¹¹ For Marx, the development of the class-conscious proletariat is an inexorable development that flows from the evolution of "human species being." The nature of human species being is grounded in the fact that humanity is born into a sociable world. This sociability is made central through the process of labour and reproduction of the species itself.

The reason for the primacy of the labour experience in Marx is simple enough.¹² Before humans can concentrate on the production of culture they must fulfil their most basic needs. Their most basic need is the production of food. Cast out from the Garden of Eden, metaphorically if not literally, humans are destined to labour in order to feed themselves.

Once their basic need to feed and shelter themselves has been satisfied, other needs arise. New needs always arise out of the satisfaction of basic needs.¹³ For Marx, then, the labour process is fundamental. Furthermore, this process, unlike that represented in the myth of Robinson Crusoe, is inherently a social process involving other human beings.¹⁴ The very essence of what it means to be human, for Marx, of necessity involves not only the self, but the other.¹⁵ This orientation to the other is, of course, most fundamentally demonstrated in the pursuit of the satisfaction of the sexual need and the need to reproduce. In general, in seeking to satisfy human needs, sociability founded on co-operation and interaction is pivotal.

It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force."¹⁶

It is the crowning achievement of capitalism as a productive force, in the above sense, that it greatly intensifies the fundamental sociability of humans. Capitalism harnesses men and women to the labour process in a greatly expanded production system that enshrines labour at the very centre of everyday experience. According to Marx, it therefore has promoted inevitably a far greater degree of social interaction and sense of mutual dependence than that which had prevailed in previous social systems. The origins of the impact of the labour process upon human consciousness Marx derived from themes explored by Hegel.¹⁷ But whereas for Hegel the implications of this consciousness were essentially confined to an ideational system, for Marx the consciousness that flowed from the labour process was to have a very real material manifestation.

While Marx celebrated the progressive character of capitalism, he also decried its inhuman nature. He basically viewed it as a schizoid social phenomenon. At the same time as it engenders mutual interdependence and growing sociability, it also fractures the objectified world that is created under it from those who are responsible for its production. Thus, for Marx, a critical tension emerges in capitalism between the social possibilities of the production process, which itself attains new heights at an almost dizzying pace, and the increasingly obsolete social relations that accompany this process. The contradiction between the two phenomena are all the more starkly drawn when the scientific and technological sophistication of the production process is compared with the backward pattern of domination that prevails in social relations.

For Marx there is, however, no question about the eventual outcome of the clash between these two contradictory tendencies. Human ontology is such that the backward nature of social relations under capitalism must give way to a new mode of social relations more in keeping with the advanced nature of the production process that has been ushered onto the stage of human history. The drive for sociability makes the appearance of

consciousness of the necessity for a new social order inevitable among the very class that the new industrial order has created. Thus, the modern proletariat, no matter how disfigured and stunted, emerges as the creator of the new social system that will abolish capitalism. Like the evolution of Hegel's *Logic* from which the notion of the proletariat is ultimately drawn, capitalism contains the seeds of its own transcendence.¹⁸

The theory of the proletariat thus has its origins in Marx's conception of human species being. While sociability has always been central to human nature in pre-capitalist society, the undeveloped nature of the production process, "the limited material mode of activity," necessarily resulted in less sociability than under capitalism.¹⁹ But as capitalism emerged and evolved, "sensuous labour and creation" becomes increasingly central to it. It is this inexorable push toward social interaction, rooted in the labour process, that throws up the modern proletariat, the "gravedigger" of capitalism. Thus, for Marx, the process of degradation and exploitation that unfolded in the nineteenth century had a redemptive character. This process and all the suffering it entailed horrified many intellectuals, including both Marx and Engels, who were among its most graphic chroniclers. But because they were modernist thinkers who believed in the Faustian myth of creative destruction, they saw the process as both necessary and progressive.²⁰ As "scientific" socialists and believers in the Enlightenment conception of progress, they remained optimistic that all the suffering heralded the coming of a new and better stage of human history. As such, even the most horrific conditions that grew out of the spread of industrial capitalist production could be viewed as evidence of the progressive historical process at work. It was from this perspective that Marx and Engels rebuked the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach for not recognizing that in the evil appearances of the downtrodden proletariat lay the salvation of humanity:

Thus [Feuerbach] never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it; therefore, when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the "higher perception" and in the ideal "compensation in the species," and thus to relapse into idealism at the very point where the communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the same time, the condition, of a transformation both of industry and of the social structure.²¹

Therefore, no matter how degraded the proletariat may become under capitalism, its human "sensuous" character can never be totally abolished. The fact that the need for sociability is so fundamental in the human condition can also be seen, according to Marx and Engels, in the role that language plays in human behaviour. Language itself would not

exist if it were not for the purpose of communicating to others.²² As Marx and Engels put it in *The German Ideology*:

Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me; language like consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. . . . Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as men exist at all.²³

This sociable nature of consciousness, its "other" orientation, is in the beginning of human society not much different from the herd instinct of animals. But "this sheep-like or tribal consciousness" is considerably heightened through the development of the productive forces and the division of labour in society. As we have stated above, capitalism extraordinarily intensifies the division of labour and therefore the degree of social interaction. Yet, at the same time, as we have also noted, this greatly increased sociability is accompanied by a growing estrangement of humans from the world they create. It is this cleavage, the concept of which can be traced in philosophical thought through Marx's mentor Hegel back to medieval thinkers such as Plotinus,²⁴ that is to be transcended by the arrival of socialism. Marx captured the essence of this argument in one of his most beautiful utopian passages:

The division of labour offers us the first example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as the cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the division of power comes into being, each man has a particular exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each one can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have mind, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.²⁵

This extraordinary passage identifies the central objective of Marx's utopian project—the emancipation of the individual from the stultifying toil of capitalist, or more accurately, industrial productivist society. The coming to fruition of a fully productive sociability, untrammelled by the fetishized addiction of capital accumulation, represented for Marx the very real possibility of a true flowering of individuality. That Marx believed in the importance, indeed the necessity, of this project is testimony to the centrality of humanist thought to his vision. That this

vision remains for the present and the foreseeable future unattainable at the same time speaks much for the utopian nature of his thought. Nevertheless, clearly Marx's vision was rooted in his sense of the inevitability of historical progress in human development.²⁶ For, ultimately, it is this belief in progress that delivers us history's agent, the modern proletariat, who despite the "muck of ages" of exploitation and repression will break the domination of capital and usher in the new millenium.

THE PROLETARIAT AS A UNIVERSAL CLASS

Marx and Engels developed their notion of class consciousness in a number of passages scattered throughout their earlier works. These works included *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, *The Holy Family*, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, *The German Ideology*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *The Communist Manifesto*, and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. In each of these works the theme of a class emerging out of the drudgery of the labour process imposed by capital accumulation and the division of labour is developed.

The proletariat as a "universal class, a class with radical chains" whose very terms of existence ensure that it has no bonds with existing society, but instead represents all humanity in its potential role as the dissolver of capitalism, makes its first appearance in *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, written in 1843 when Marx was twenty-five years of age. Marx derived this role for the proletariat after rejecting the argument advanced by Hegel that the bureaucracy in German civil society was a universal class that could properly represent the interests of the whole community.²⁷

The Hegelian roots of Marx and Engels's conception of the proletariat are clearly revealed in *The Holy Family*, a violent polemic that they wrote against the "speculative idealism" of critical criticism in 1844.²⁸ In this polemic Marx and Engels excoriated the work of their former collaborators in the radical Young Hegelian circle as the most "dangerous enemy" of German humanism and the cause of progressive social change. They caustically rejected the suggestion by the leading exponent of critical criticism, the philosopher Bruno Bauer (who himself had been a mentor and close friend of Marx), that the proletariat as a class was utterly incapable of transcending its own limited material self-interest and was therefore a bulwark of conservatism rather than an agency of social emancipation.²⁹

Instead, they presented the proletariat as the very antithesis of capitalist society. As a class "the proletariat . . . is compelled to abolish itself, and thereby its opposite, private property, which determines its existence and which makes it proletariat." As such, the proletariat was the very negation of capitalism, "dissolved and self-dissolving private prop-

erty."³⁰ While both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat suffered from self-estrangement under capitalism, the bourgeoisie welcomed this state of alienation as the sign of its own power. Furthermore, unlike the proletariat, the bourgeoisie is able to have "a semblance of human existence" under capitalism. The proletariat, however, feels "annihilated in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence."³¹ According to Marx and Engels, therefore, and following Hegel, the proletariat is the "indignation" at the "abasement" to which it is subjected, "an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its *human nature* and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature."³²

Thus, the private property owner is the conserver and defender of the new social system that has been created under his hegemony. The proletariat, in keeping with the Hegelian system from which Marx and Engels derived their philosophical orientation, and itself a creation of capitalism, became its destroyer. The system therefore moves inexorably toward its own transcendence. It itself produces the seeds of its own destruction. The proletariat, furthermore, by abolishing the capitalist system, also abolishes itself as a class. By so doing it takes the place of the bureaucracy as a universal class.

Indeed private property drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it, which is unconscious and which takes place against the will of private property by the very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat as proletariat, poverty which is conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty, de-humanization which is conscious of its de-humanization, and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by producing the proletariat, just as it executes the sentence that wage-labour pronounces on itself by producing wealth for others and poverty for itself.³³

This passage clearly reveals that Marx and Engels integrated their theory of the proletariat with the rather mystical conception of the unified subject-object developed at some length in Hegel's philosophy. The proletariat thus can be seen in Marx and Engels's classical system as being as much a philosophical category as a sociological one.³⁴

Of course, Marx and Engels always boasted that they had brought Hegelian idealist logic down to earth and invested it with a real material force for social emancipation. Indeed, that was the very thrust of their critique of the other Young Hegelians. Despite the philosophical origins of the role they ascribed to the proletariat, they grounded their analysis in the very real social forces they observed growing up all around them. Nevertheless, the ultimate basis for a theory of a revolutionary proletariat

was indeed rooted in the ontological character of human needs. It was on the basis of these fundamental human needs that Marx argued that, despite the degradations of proletarian existence under early industrial capitalism (which he was to document with great power in his later work), the proletarian class would develop revolutionary class consciousness. Furthermore, Marx explicitly rejected the notion that the ascription of potential class consciousness to the proletariat was in any way born out of a religious Messianism.

When socialist writers ascribe this world historic role to the proletariat, it is not at all as Critical Criticism pretends to believe because they regard the proletarians as *gods*. Rather the contrary. Since in the fully-formed proletariat the abstraction of all humanity, even of the *semblance* of humanity, is practically complete; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all of the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative *need*, the practical expression of *necessity* is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life . . . without abolishing *all* the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of labour. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment *regards* as its aim. It is a question of what *the proletariat is* and what, in accordance, with this *being*, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today. There is no need to explain here that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already *conscious* of its historic task and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity.³⁵

Thus, despite the notion of what Georg Lukács and Lucien Goldmann were later to refer to as "imputed class consciousness,"³⁶ Marx and Engels attempted to link their conception of consciousness rooted in ontology and Hegelian logic with the actually existing proletariat in contemporary capitalism. Whether, in fact, this proletariat possessed the potential they thought it did is another question altogether. Nevertheless, despite the philosophical origins of their theory of consciousness, it cannot be denied that it was also linked to the very real social class that was in the process of being born at the time of their work. It was the ingenious weaving together of social ontology and empirical analysis that made the theory of social transformation that Marx and Engels developed so powerful and so appealing. For in the face of the horrors of the industrial revolution and the degradation that it imposed upon human

life, Marx offered the possibility of believing that the system could be transcended by the very forces that it had unleashed. More than any of the other urban dreamers, Marx had a vision of the future that could inspire followers.

It is in this sense that Marx fits so well within the modernist camp. It is, of course, this sense of inevitable progress that gave hope to many exploited people and, like Christianity itself, proffered the prospects of salvation, if not in the here and now, then at least in the future. The cause was just and victory would come to the exploited. It was this religious quality of redemption wholly consistent with both Marx's Jewish heritage and his Christian training that gave until quite recently Marxism its appeal among oppressed peoples. It is clearly no accident that liberation theology, for example, has developed out of Catholicism's encounter with Marxism.

For intellectuals who challenged the hypocrisy of the epoch and proffered atheism as an answer, Marx had a more powerful message of radical rejection:

Atheism ... has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a *negation of God* and postulates the existence of *man* through this negation; but socialism no longer stands in need of any such mediation. Socialism is man's *positive self-consciousness* no longer mediated through the annulment of religion, just as *real life* is man's positive reality.⁵⁷

For working men and women Marx offered an optimistic interpretation of the very forces with which they were so intimately familiar. It is not surprising, then, that Marxism in time became a powerful political force, albeit in vulgarized form.

WORKING-CLASS COMMUNITY AND THE CREATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MODERN METROPOLIS

In his work Marx documented the extraordinary degradation that capitalism as a social system imposed upon human beings. His descriptions were so vivid, so chilling, that in the face of them one wonders how the transcendence of capitalism could ever come about. This is particularly true of the description of the reified and instrumentalized nature of human behaviour under capitalism that he offered in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. The following passage is so acute in its portrayal that it merits reproduction in full:

The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the modern economic system and it is the only need which the latter produces. The *quantity* of money becomes to an ever greater degree its sole *effective* attribute: just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself

in the course of its own movement to something merely *quantitative*. Excess and intemperance come to be its true norm. Subjectively this is even partly manifested in that the extension of products and needs falls into *contriving* and ever *calculating* subservience to inhuman, refined, unnatural and *imaginary* appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude need into *human* need. Its *idealism* is *fantasy*, *caprice* and *whim*; and no eunuch flatters his despot more basely or uses more despicable means to stimulate his dulled capacity for pleasure in order to sneak a favour for himself than does the industrial eunuch—the producer—in order to sneak for himself a few pennies—in order to charm the golden birds out of the pockets of his Christianly beloved neighbours. He puts himself at the service of the others' most depraved fancies, plays the pimp between him and his need, excites in him morbid appetites, lies in wait for each of his weaknesses—all so that he can demand the cash for this service of love. . . . This estrangement manifests itself in that it produces refinement of needs of their means on the one hand, and a bestial barbarisation, a complete unrefined abstract simplicity of need, on the other. . . . Even the need for fresh air ceases for the worker. Man returns to living in a cave which is now, however, contaminated with the mephitic breath of plague given off by civilization, and which he continues to occupy only *precariously*, it being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him any day—a place for which if he does not pay, he can be thrown out any day. For this mortuary he has to *pay*. A dwelling in the *light* which Prometheus in Aeschylus designated as one of the greatest boons, by means of which he made the savage into a human being, ceases to exist for the worker. Light, air, etc.—the simplest *animal*-cleanliness—ceases to be a need for man. *Dirt*, this stagnation and putrefaction of man, the *sewage* of civilization, quite literally comes to be the *element of life* for him. Utter, *unnatural* neglect, putrified nature, comes to be his life *element*. None of his senses exist any longer, and not only in his human fashion, but in an *inhuman* fashion and therefore not even in animal fashion. The crudest *modes* (and *instruments*) of human labour are coming back: the *tread-mill* of the Roman slaves, for instance, is the means of production, the means of existence, of many English workers. It is not only that man has no human needs—even his animal needs are ceasing to exist. . . . machine labour is simplified in order to make a worker out of the human being still in the making, the completely immature human being, the child—whilst the worker has become a neglected child. The machine accommodates itself to the *weakness* of the human being in order to make the *weak* human being into a machine.³⁸

Despite the depths of degradation described in this passage and the notion that man had been objectified into a machine by the dictates of capitalist production, Marx was impressed by the paradoxical new sense of sociability he believed that capitalism was creating among workers. With the romantic idealism of a bourgeois youth first coming into contact with working people, Marx described this growing sociability in the following terms:

When communist workmen associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc. is their first end. But at the same time, *as a result of this association*, they acquire a new need—the need for society—and what appears as means becomes an end. You can observe this practical process in its most splendid results whenever you see French socialist workers together. Such things as smoking, drinking, etc. are no longer means of contact or means that bring together. *Company, association, and conversation*, which again has society as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies.³⁹

This very romantic portrait reveals Marx's hopeful optimism about working-class culture. At the same time, it points to a very critical ingredient in his notion of the development of working-class consciousness, here still in its embryonic form. It is his emphasis upon "company, association, and conversation" with "society as its end" to which we wish to draw our attention. It is precisely this notion of growing association and sociability that Marx argues is promoted by capitalism both through the greater degree of interdependence in the labour process itself and in civil society proper. However, with the daily experience of common association outside of the workplace, it would seem highly likely, particularly in the light of Marx's own analysis of the deformed nature of work under capitalism, that the alienation of the labour process would prove to be a major stumbling block to the development of consciousness.⁴⁰

It is precisely because of the importance that Marx attached to association that he looked toward the concentration of the industrial proletariat in major metropolises as the essential ingredient in the process of the creation of class consciousness. The very notion of a public sphere and a sense of community that in the past had been associated with classical and medieval pre-capitalist societies was to be created anew in the modern metropolis.⁴¹ Only this time, unlike in the past, this public sphere was not to be restricted to the ruling elite. Instead, it was to include the proletariat who were to create from it the movement that would inaugurate the new society.

Marx thus appreciated the organic nature of feudal and tribal society. This stage of social development, however, corresponded with a much more primitive stage in the development of the means of production. As such, feudal and tribal society, according to Marx, was incapable of supporting the emancipation of the individual in the context of a society largely freed from collective toil. This state, however, Marx believed was attainable at the material level of progress that capitalism had created.

In many respects, therefore, the search for a new organic community, albeit at a much higher stage of economic development, lay behind Marx's theory of the class-conscious proletariat. In this respect, Marx's work was definitely in the tradition of Western humanism beginning with

the Greeks and culminating in the work of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel.⁴² Yet, at the heart of Marx's conception of the solution to the problem of loss of community lay a puzzling paradox. The organic nature of feudal society contrasted sharply with its material possibilities and therefore guaranteed an authoritarian political culture. The extraordinary material possibilities of capitalism, however, offered the promise of social and individual emancipation. But this new level of material productivity had brought with it a highly fragmented and deformed social life. And yet, Marx argued that out of this atomized social life would come a unified emancipatory force—the class-conscious proletariat. It is this puzzling contradiction that is at the centre of my argument about the nature of metropolitan culture in modern capitalist society.

Marx was not unaware of this contradiction. In *The German Ideology* written in 1845 he and Engels once again raised the notion of the proletariat as the universal class whose "communist consciousness" (a consciousness which they added might arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of the working class) would lead to a social revolution that would do away with the very notion of class rule altogether. But in order for this consciousness to arise on a mass scale,

the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; the revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.⁴³

This qualification, which Marx and Engels posed to their original theory of class consciousness emanating out of the labour process and the growing sociability of capitalism, was expanded upon in later passages in *The German Ideology*. In particular, Marx and Engels drew attention to the importance of overcoming the competitive ethos that capitalism fostered:

Competition separates individuals from one another, not only the bourgeois but still more the workers, in spite of the fact that it brings them together. Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite, apart from the fact that for the purpose of this union—if it is not to be merely local—the *necessary means, the big industrial cities and cheap and quick communications, have first to be produced by large scale industry*. Hence every organized power standing over against those isolated individuals, who live in conditions daily reproducing this isolation, can only be overcome after long struggles. To demand the opposite would be tantamount to demanding that competition should not exist in this definite epoch of history, or that the

individuals should banish from their minds conditions over which in isolation they have no control.⁴⁴

What both of the above passages indicate is that Marx and Engels were aware that the real as opposed to ontological condition of the proletariat under capitalism was such that a passage to class consciousness could only come about under exceptional conditions after a long period of struggle and education. Nevertheless, they also clearly believed that the capital accumulation emphasized increased interaction in the labour process and the concentration of workers into large urban settlements. This, in turn, led to a great increase in the possibilities for social communication, which laid the necessary foundations for the development of class consciousness.

This emphasis upon social interaction and communication was developed further by Marx in his polemic against the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *The Poverty of Philosophy* written in 1846. Here Marx discussed the importance of trade unions in helping to develop the common association and sense of community that were to form the basis of class consciousness. While such trade union struggles occur in the first place for the purposes of increasing wages or improving working conditions, Marx believed that they had the potential to achieve a dynamic of their own in which the sense of solidarity and community of those who struggled together would be significantly enhanced. Thus, the collective group dynamics of trade union struggles could take on a political character:

Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. However, the maintenance of wages, this common interest in opposition to their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—combination. This combination always has a double goal, that of stopping competition among themselves, in order to bring about a general competition with the capitalist. If the first aim of resistance was *only* the maintenance of wages, combinations at first isolated constitute themselves into groups, as the capitalists in their turn unite as a repressive force, and *then* in the face of this united capital, the *very* maintenance of association becomes more necessary to them than even that of maintaining wages. *That* is so true that English economists are amazed to see workers sacrifice a good part of their wages in favour of association, which in the eyes of economists were established *solely* for wage-bargaining purposes. In this struggle—a veritable civil war—are united and developed all the elements necessary for the coming battle. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character. Economic relations had first transformed the mass of the people into workers. The domination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class in opposition to capital, however not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have only noted a few phases, this mass becomes

united and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests which it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle.⁴⁵

Thus, while Marx appreciated the limitations of trade union consciousness, he saw the potential for such economically motivated struggles to alter the consciousness of those who participated in them. While this remains undoubtedly true, contemporary trade union disputes, both in the way they are perceived by the public and in the way they are conducted by unions, seem far removed from Marx's idealistic description of the process of struggle. The language persists, but unfortunately the rhetoric masks a far different and much shallower experience.

In Marx's model, however, this alteration in consciousness was dependent upon the barriers that existed among workers being broken down by the sense of common struggle. The communication of this sense of commonality beyond the boundaries of the local workplace or trade union was to be facilitated by the metropolis itself. It was the complex web of social life and community at work, at home, and in the streets of the modern metropolis that was to be the environment in which class consciousness was to develop. Yet, Marx and Engels were acutely aware that capitalism simultaneously undermined the very forces that they identified with the development of consciousness. This occurred through the spread of a competitive ethos and a privatized conception of daily life, both at work and at home. These were the social forces that presented daily reality in a reified form. The true nature of society was thereby masked. Increasingly, relationships, even those of a very personal nature, tended to be reduced to the level of money. The very complexity of metropolitan life and its dependence upon instrumental relations might work in a direction quite different from their aspirations.

We have thus come full circle. Clearly, the Marxian theory of class consciousness, rooted as it is in social ontology, nevertheless attaches critical importance to the metropolis. Yet, at the same time, neither Marx nor Engels was unaware of the alienating potential of metropolitan life. This, then, was the ambiguous legacy of their response to the rise of industrial capitalism and the metropolitan form that it spawned.

We can see, therefore, in Marx's work, despite his optimism, a basic tension. This tension, which revolves around the ambiguous nature of community in metropolitan capitalism, ultimately has its roots in the contradictory nature of capitalism itself.⁴⁶ This contradictory nature involves concentrating unprecedented masses of people in urban settings, and yet, at the same time, isolating them one from another. It is precisely this tension that I explore in detail in the chapters to come. I hope, by so doing, to balance Marx's optimism about the city with a more realistic view of the possibilities for the development of class conscious-

ness and the sustaining of community in modern metropolitan society, particularly as it has evolved in North American capitalism. For it is in North America that the purest form of the capitalist metropolis exists, unencumbered by the legacies of pre-capitalist social systems. It is here, therefore, that we may find Marx's theory of consciousness most amenable to critical analysis.

It is my intention to use the analysis of class consciousness and community in the context of modern urbanization as it is developed in the work of Marx and Engels as the jumping-off point for the analysis that follows. I intend to show how a number of the themes that are explored in their work recur in the later writings of social theorists on the metropolis of both radical and more conservative persuasion. The implications for political behaviour that flow from the paradoxical situation of the metropolis as both the locus for the alienation and the concentration of working people, despite the eclipse of Marxist socialism, are still highly relevant for a contemporary theory of urban politics and public policy.

NOTES

1. Marx and Engels were clearly influenced by the optimistic conceptions of progress that prevailed in the work of a number of nineteenth-century thinkers. In a certain sense they shared a Comteian style of positivism. They believed that the development of class consciousness and thereby the eclipse of capitalism was as inevitable as the evolutionary development of the human species. For a brilliant discussion of the Faustian pact that Marx and Engels made with industrial technology and progress, see M. Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). See also R. Jacoby, *The Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 26-27, "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács to the Frankfurt School," *Telos* 10 (Winter 1971):119-46, and "What is Conformist Marxism *Telos* 45 (Fall 1980): 19-44.
2. See F. Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958), translated by W. O. Henderson and W. Chalenor. For a fascinating political and literary interpretation of this work, see S. Marcus, *Engels, Manchester and the Working Class* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1974).
3. Engels, *The Condition*, pp. 137-38.
4. See Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, edited by Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 263.
5. Engels, *The Condition*, p. 30.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31. Compare the translation with Engels in *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 4:329.
7. Engels, *The Condition*, in *Collected Works*, 4:308–9. This picture of eighteenth-century rural society in England has been challenged by writers such as Raymond Williams, who argue that capitalism had penetrated rural society, in fact, much earlier than the founding of the industrial towns. See R. Williams, *The Country and the City* (London: Granada Publishing, 1973). See also M. Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1947).
8. See, for example, K. Marx and F. Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, edited by L. Feuer (New York: Doubleday, 1959). Marx and Engels associated "reactionary socialism" with the aristocracy who: "in order to arouse sympathy... were obliged to lose sight, apparently of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the working class alone. . . . In this way arose feudal socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty, and incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to its very heart's core, but always ludicrous in its effect through *total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history*" (emphasis my own).
9. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
10. K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p. 106 (emphasis my own).
11. The literature on Marx's social ontology is vast. For a penetrating account in which the connection between class consciousness and ontology is carefully explored, see G. Lukács, *On Social Ontology: Marx* (London: Merlin Press, 1980). See also C. Gould, *Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social Reality* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980). For a very critical and pessimistic analysis of the totalitarian potential of Marx's social ontology, see L. Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders* (Oxford University Press, 1981). See also Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air*.
12. For the distinction between the phenomenon of labour and that of work, see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). Arendt criticizes Marx for blurring the distinction between labour as necessary toil and work as a creative process involving both speech and action. This results, according to Arendt, in a productivist bias in Marx's work. For a thorough discussion of Arendt's critique, see P. Hansen, "A Critical Philosophy and Its Critical Limits: The Aesthetic Dimension of Hannah Arendt's Political Thought," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1981, ch. 3; Hansen's work is forthcoming as a book from Polity Press.

13. For an illuminating discussion of the role of needs in Marx, see A. Heller, *The Theory of Need in Marx* (London: Allison and Busby, 1976).
14. "Man is a *zoon politikon* in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal but an animal that can be individuated only within society. Production by a solitary individual outside society—a rare event which might occur when a civilized person who has already absorbed the dynamic social forces is accidentally cast into the wilderness—is just as preposterous as the development of speech without individuals who live together and talk to one another." From *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. 189. For a brilliant analysis of the misleading use to which the story of Robinson Crusoe has been put in social theory, in general, and neo-classical economics, in particular, see S. Hymer. "The Myth of Robinson Crusoe," *Collected Papers* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).
15. This emphasis upon the social nature of man is a very ancient theme in political philosophy. In modern political philosophy it receives particular emphasis in the work of Rousseau. It also plays an important role in the work of Kant. See L. Goldmann, *Immanuel Kant* (London: New Left Books, 1971); A. Horowitz, *Rousseau, Nature and History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
16. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology in Collected Works*, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 5:43.
17. See G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 229ff. Hegel develops the notion that the very act of the bondsmen being enslaved to the lord enables him to develop a sense of self-consciousness and his relation to others, which ultimately lays the basis for his realizing the necessity of risking his life for freedom.
18. See Lukács, *On Social Ontology: Hegel*.
19. Marx, *German Ideology*, p. 36.
20. See Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air* for a fascinating account of this aspect of Marx and Engels's work. Berman's work, which explores many of the same themes as my own, was unavailable to me when I first drafted this book in manuscript form. Readers might note some strong parallels between our two works, although they make use of quite different writers to argue somewhat similar themes. The fact that both works were conceived and originally drafted around the same period is suggestive of how pervasive the urban or modern sensibility is and of the harmony of the creative imagination. It also confirms the old wisdom that original insights are often shared by a number of investigators who develop them independently. See also David Harvey, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in*

the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) for an exploration of some of these themes, but from quite a different perspective.

21. Marx, *German Ideology*, p. 41.
22. The films *L'enfant Sauvage* by François Truffaut and *The Enigma of Kaspar H.* by W. Herzog both depict the complete inability of children who grow up deprived of human contact to speak.
23. Marx, *German Ideology*, p. 44. See also Lukács, *On Social Ontology: Marx*, p. 136.
24. See Kolakowski, *Marxism*, vol. I.
25. Marx, *German Ideology*, p. 47 and pp. 9ff.
26. On the importance of a belief in historical progress in Marx's thought, see Lukács, *On Social Ontology: Marx*. For a more pessimistic account of the notion of progress, see M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972).
27. See K. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). On the general background to this critique, see also G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 132; D. McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970); S. Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and Z. Rosen, *Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).
28. K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Holy Family* in *Collected Works*, 4:1-211.
29. Zvi Rosen argues that, in a certain sense, Bruno Bauer anticipated some of the ideas of Herbert Marcuse when he wrote: "[The] masses who recognize no supreme value except for their own sensual existence, will they hesitate to submit to capital and to its rule, if it promises them employment and life?" In Bauer's view, according to Rosen, the masses are incapable of understanding anything but crude simple dogma. As such, the dogmas of the ruling class which are hegemonic find easy acceptance. Because the masses are incapable of critical thought, they are content to let the ruling class do its thinking for them.

Furthermore, Bauer was skeptical about the consequences of imposing a stateless utopia through communist revolution. He suspected, correctly as it turns out, that such an experiment would lead to an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small minority, greatly increase the size and power of the bureaucracy, give free rein to the police, and continue the repression of humanistic intellectuals. (Time will tell if the reforms currently being introduced under the *perestroika* policy of Gorbachev will permanently rescue the Russian Revolution from the agony of these totalitarian

impulses. In any case, it would appear that *perestroika* is as much inspired by Western market notions of liberal democracy as it is by the democratic values of socialism. If the social democratic Mensheviks rather than the Bolsheviks had triumphed after the revolution against Czarist autocracy, perhaps the results would have been much different. In that event Bernstein's notion of gradual evolution of capitalist society into social democracy might have been the guide, and the degeneration of the idealistic aspirations of the Russian intelligentsia into the horrors of Stalinism might have never occurred.)

In the light of Bauer's views and given his opposition to the ruling class of his day, it is perhaps not surprising that he believed that the only sensible course of action for critical intellectuals was to withdraw from active involvement in political life and pursue a life devoted to pure criticism. It was for these views that Bauer was the object of the caustic polemic written by Marx and Engels in *The Holy Family*. See Rosen, *Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx*, ch. 7, pp. 233ff.

30. Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, p. 36.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. (emphasis my own).
33. Ibid.
34. For the Hegelian notion of the unified subject-object of Absolute Spirit, see Hegel, *The Phenomenology of the Mind*. For a discussion of the philosophical origins of this notion, see Kolakowski, *Marxism*, ch. 1.
35. Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, p. 37 (emphasis in the original).
36. Imputed class consciousness is essentially potential class consciousness that can be ascribed to a class as a whole. It is contrasted with the actual psychological state of consciousness of individual members of the class. This notion is critically discussed below in Chapter 8 on Lukács.
37. K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 114. Much of the debate among the radical Young Hegelians concerned the question of religion. See Rosen, *Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx*.
38. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, pp. 116–18 (emphasis in the original).
39. Ibid., pp. 124–25.
40. For a contemporary account of the fragmentation of the work process, see H. Braverman, *Labour and Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). For an analysis of the impact of this fragmentation upon consciousness, see A. Friedman, *Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work in Monopoly Capitalism* (London:

- Macmillan, 1977), and D. Wells, *Empty Promises* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986).
41. On the notion of the public sphere in classical thought, see Arendt, *The Human Condition*. For a fascinating account of its rich quality in medieval society, see R. C. Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence* (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Marx discussed the positive organic quality of tribal and medieval society in *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 485–86.
 42. See Goldmann, *Kant*; R. Plant, *Hegel* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973); C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Horowitz, *Rousseau*.
 43. Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, pp. 52–53 (emphasis in original).
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (emphasis my own).
 45. K. Marx. *The Poverty of Philosophy* (London: Martin Lawrence, n.d.), pp. 80–81.
 46. The very notion of contradictory tendencies in the development of class consciousness parallels contradictions in the development of the subject and self-consciousness in the work of Hegel. See the discussion of this problem in Taylor, *Hegel*, pp. 85–90.